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ESSAY
VICTORIAN FROM BEACON HILL: OLIVER WENDELL
HOLMES'S EARLY LEGAL SCHOLARSHIP
William P. LaPiana*
In the years leading up to the publication of The Common Law'
Oliver Wendell Holmes wrote extensively, publishing numerous arti-
cles and many book reviews in the American Law Review. After taking his
seat on the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court in 1883 he wrote far
less frequently for publication and the vast majority of his work, of
course, is his opinions. In his article on Holmes's Supreme Judicial
Court opinions Professor Tushnet rightly emphasizes the difficulties of
using those opinions as gauges of Holmes's thought.2 The content of
the opinions is constrained by the nature of the questions before the
court, and Holmes's addressing of those questions is further con-
strained by the need to carry his colleagues with him, at least in major-
ity opinions. These constraints of collegiality often removed Holmes
himself from the work he produced.3 Occasionally, however, Holmes
himself shines through and he is able to apply his ideas about law to the
case at hand.
4
Still, on the whole, it is in those early writings, culminating with
The Common Law, that Holmes's ideas were formed. Those ideas re-
mained with Holmes for all of his long life, although as Professor
Tushnet observes, they underwent a change in emphasis, certain
themes moving into greater prominence and others receding deeper
into the background.
5
Investigating Holmes's thought is not a straightforward undertak-
ing. Neglect of his early writings and concentration on his judicial
opinions has led to distortions, especially exaggerated assertions of his
originality and pivotal place in American legal thought.
6
* Associate Professor of Law, New York Law School. A.B. 1973, A.M. 1975, J.D.
1978, Ph.D. 1987, Harvard University.
1. O.W. Holmes, The Common Law (1881).
2. Tushnet, The Logic of Experience: Oliver Wendell Holmes on the SupremeJu-
dicial Court, 63 Va. L. Rev. 975, 978 (1977).
3. Id. at 978-79.
4. See, e.g., Vegelahn v. Guntner, 167 Mass. 92, 104-09, 44 N.E. 1077, 1079-82
(1896) (Holmes, J., dissenting) (discussion of policy issues involved in labor dispute
picketing); Norcross v. James, 140 Mass. 188, 192, 2 N.E. 946, 949 (1885) (historical
discussion of covenants running with the land).
5. Tushnet, supra note 2, at 978.
6. See G. Aichele, Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr.: Soldier, Scholar, Judge 123-24
(1989); Tushnet, supra note 2, at 1005-12. One exception is The Formative Essays of
Justice Holmes: The Making of an American Legal Philosophy (F. Kellogg ed. 1984),
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The themes were present from the beginning, however, and a care-
ful teasing out of the various strands of thought present in the early
work provides the indispensable framework for evaluating Holmes both
'as a thinker and as a judge. This Essay examines Holmes's early writ-
ings through the publication of The Common Law from the perspective of
their relationship to Anglo-American legal thought of the time. The
salient characteristics of Holmes's thought-the empirical nature of
legal science and the importance of studying law as it is rather than as it
should be-are a fundamental part of the legal culture in which Holmes
came to intellectual maturity. Much of what we associate with Holmes
as his unique contribution to legal thought, especially his "bad man"
theory of the law and his refusal to equate law with morality, are elabo-
rations of a rich stream of legal thought in which he was a participant.
Even the antidemocratic aspects of his thought that have caused much
discomfort to some commentators were shared among Victorian legal
thinkers.7 By putting Holmes into context, this Essay hopes to illumi-
nate one aspect of the legal culture of the past.8
I. HOLMES AND VICTORIAN LEGAL THOUGHT
Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., came of age at an exciting time in the
intellectual history of Anglo-American law and of thought about society
in general. One of the most important developments was the emer-
gence of the new idea of legal science. Turning away from the moral-
which reprints the early essays and finds them important clues to Holmes's legal
thought.
7. See, e.g., G. Aichele, supra note 6, at 162-64; G. Gilmore, The Ages of
American Law 48-49 (1977).
8. Holmes's personality seems to have fascinated those who have studied him even
more than have his ideas. See, e.g., G. Aichele, supra note 6, at 3, 20, 69; White, The
Rise and Fall ofJustice Holmes, 39 U. Chi. L. Rev. 1, 51-52 (1971). The net effect of
this personalized approach to Holmes is to find the source of his ideas in his personality.
Holmes's family life, his difficult relationship with his father and his experiences in war
all undoubtedly contributed to his outlook on life in general and his views of law in
particular. To focus so intensively on these aspects of the man, however, obscures the
extent to which he consciously thought about the matters that engaged his interest and
the extent to which he consulted, accepted and rejected the views of others. This ap-
proach also puts us in danger of losing sight of the extent to which Holmes was a person
of his times, participating in the general culture of his world.
The great attention paid to Holmes as judge says much about the state of legal
history in America. On the whole, American legal history lives in America's law schools
rather than in graduate faculties of arts and sciences. Its practitioners often are lawyers
first and historians second, even when they have done graduate study in history. As
lawyers, they are wedded to the text in which the law is found, and this focus on the
specific document sometimes tends to limit historical inquiry. At the extreme, such an
attitude has probably contributed to the strength in current legal thought of a congeries
of ideas and attitudes loosely grouped under the term "deconstructionism." Perhaps it
is not surprising that many of the law school adherents of these new ideas have been
drawn to the study of history. See P. Novick, That Noble Dream: The "Objectivity
Question" and the American Historical Profession 555-57 (1988).
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ism of the preceeding generations, the new legal scientists sought to
study law as it was without considering what it should be. Their goal
was to develop ajurisprudence that would properly classify and arrange
the principles of the law. Holmes played an important role in American
attempts to refine and apply the new legal science. Along with his com-
panions in the Metaphysical Club, especially Nicholas St. John Green,
he labored to break the hold of an antiquated moralism on the study of
the law. He eventually came to place the greatest importance on
facts-in certain factual situations, the power of the state forces individ-
uals to conform to standards of behavior.
Holmes came to this empirical approach to law through the study
of history, which confirmed for him the basic truth of John Austin's
assertions about the nature of law. Holmes blended historical and ana-
lytical jurisprudence, concluding that the former confirmed the latter.
His final position was shared by the law teachers who were transform-
ing the Harvard Law School. The case method itself is a reflection of
the new scientific approach to law, and Holmes himself is in some ways
an intellectual comrade of Christopher Columbus Langdell. Scholarly
treatment of Holmes's ideas has suffered from the lack of appreciation
of his deep immersion in the new legal thought.
A. A New Legal Science
About the time of the American Civil War thinkers on both sides of
the Atlantic had begun to examine critically and to refashion the gen-
eral approach to society that had held sway over earlier generations.9
In the field of law this change was symbolized by the writings of John
Austin and Henry Maine. These two men became the exemplars of two
"modem" approaches to law, the analytical and the historical.
For Austin, understanding could be reached only by separating
what he called positive law from positive morality. Granted, Austin's
thought is subtle and is often expressed in convoluted prose.10 In addi-
tion, he never finished his great project to restate definitively the sci-
ence of the law. The posthumous publication of Austin's work in the
early 1860s, however, set loose upon the common law world two im-
portant ideas. First, law could and should be separated from morality,
at least for purposes of study. Second, all law is directly or indirectly
the command of the sovereign. Both of these ideas have long reverber-
ated in Anglo-American legal thought.
Austin was not an amoral monster, nor did he share in the atheism
of most utilitarians. Much of his first published work, The Province of
9. For concise explanations of traditional common law thinking, see D. Lieberman,
The Province of Legislation Determined: Legal Theory in Eighteenth-Century Britain
1-176 (1989); G. Postema, Bentham and the Common Law Tradition 3-38 (1986).
10. The fullest treatment of Austin's thought is W. Rumble, The Thought ofJohn
Austin: Jurisprudence, Colonial Reform, and the British Constitution (1985).
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Jurisprudence Determined,"1 is taken up with an elaborate discussion of
ethics. The precise role of this discussion in his thought is a matter of
dispute, but it is clear that for Austin the study of the science of law
meant the study of law as it is, without consideration of what it should
be. The study of what law ought to be is the province of the science of
legislation.
1 2
If Austin sought scientific accuracy through the separation of the is
and the ought, Maine sought it through the investigation of the origin
of legal rules in the past, especially the Roman past, and through expla-
nation of the mechanisms by which the law had changed in response to
changes in society. Maine clearly emphasized his work's scientific
character:
If by any means we can determine the early forms ofjural con-
ceptions, they will be invaluable to us. These rudimentary
ideas are to the jurist what the primary crusts of the earth are
to the geologist. They contain, potentially, all the forms in
which law has subsequently exhibited itself.13
Ignorance of these early forms is responsible for the "unsatisfactory
condition in which we find the science ofjurisprudence."' 4 By ignoring
the facts of legal history jurists place assumption over observation. The
result is that:
[t]heories, plausible and comprehensive, but absolutely unver-
ified, . . . enjoy a universal preference over sober research into
the primitive history of society and law; and they obscure the
truth not only by diverting attention from the only quarter in
which it can be found, but by that most real and most impor-
tant influence which, when once entertained and believed in,
they are enabled to exercise on the later stages of
jurisprudence. 15
11. J. Austin, The Province ofJurisprudence Determined (1861).
12. Id. at 71-87.
13. H. Maine, Ancient Law: Its Connection with the Early History of Society and
Its Relation to Modem Ideas 2-3 (F. Pollock ed. 10th ed. 1906) (Londorl 1861). See
generally R. Cocks, Sir Henry Maine: A Study in Victorian Jurisprudence 33-34 (1988)
(discussing Maine's historical approach to law); G. Feaver, From Status to Contract: A
Biography of Sir Henry Maine, 1822-1888, at 45--64 (1969) (Maine hoped to demon-
strate that a greater appreciation of the social basis of all legal institutions would be
achieved by using historians' techniques). Cocks emphasizes Maine's use of comparative
method, which was widely regarded at the time as the highest form of scientific inquiry.
See R. Cocks, supra, at 34-38.
14. H. Maine, supra note 13, at 3.
15. Id. at 3. Maine hoped to break the hold of such a priori concepts on legal
thought and substitute for them a scientific understanding of the growth of law. His
chapter on the early history of property is a model of his method. See id. at 237-94. He
criticizes the belief, given classic form by Blackstone, that occupancy is the foundation of
private property. The whole law of private property, according to Blackstone, is "a nat-
ural development from the physical appropriation of unowned things." Utz, Maine's
Ancient Law and Legal Theory, 16 Conn. L. Rev. 821, 833 (1984) (footnote omitted); see
also H. Maine, supra note 13, at 245-46. The gradual development of permanent own-
812 [Vol. 90:809
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The philosophic aspect of Ancient Law was overshadowed by what
was assumed to be the historical message of the work. 16 It seems that
for many readers only one phrase in the entire book was important:
"[W]e may say that the movement of the progressive societies has hith-
erto been a movementfrom Status to Contract."'17 Although as Frederick
Pollock noted "it is not clear how far Maine regarded the movement of
which he spoke as a phase of the larger political individualism which
prevailed in the eighteenth century and a great part of the nineteenth,
or what he would have thought of the reaction against this doctrine
which we are now [in 1906] witnessing," many of Maine's readers
found in his assertion support for their faith in laissez-faire. 18 They
also found a convenient weapon with which to fend off Austin's analyti-
cal jurisprudence. Commentators often stated that Maine's historical
jurisprudence proved that the law was not a command of the state but
an organic growth. Holmes, however, never shared that opinion.
B. Holmes and the New Jurisprudence
The ferment in legal thought did not go unremarked in Boston. As
Christopher Columbus Langdell was settling into his new job as Dean
of the Harvard Law School, a "distinguished group of young intellectu-
als" in the Boston area had been investigating legal science for some
years, discussing their findings in a group that would be known to his-
tory as the Metaphysical Club and publishing some of their work in the
ership thus appears to be the natural accompaniment of progress towards modernity.
Maine, however, denigrated this sort of reasoning:
These sketches of the plight of human beings in the first ages of the world are
effected by first supposing mankind to be divested of a great part of the circum-
stances by which they are now surrounded, and by then assuming that, in the
condition thus imagined, they would preserve the same sentiments and
prejudices by which they are now actuated,-although, in fact, these sentiments
may have been created and engendered by those very circumstances of which,
by the hypothesis, they are to be stripped.
H. Maine, supra note 13, at 246-47. In this case, the sentiment or prejudice which is
assumed to be always in existence is "an instinctive bias towards the institution of Prop-
erty." Id. at 249. In Maine's view, however, occupancy; or "mere possession," as a
means of gaining ownership can arise only after the institution of property has been well
established. Only after society accepts "a presumption, arising out of the long continu-
ance of that institution, that everything ought to have an owner" can the person who merely
asserts ownership acquire permanent, inviolable rights. Id. In short, talk of the almost
mystical primacy of private property is misplaced. See Utz, supra, at 824-38. Once the
jurist had untangled the developments leading to law as it was today he would have a
collection of principles which could be properly ordered into a code of law. R. Cocks,
supra note 13, at 5.
16. See Utz, supra note 15, at 823-24.
17. H. Maine, supra note 13, at 165.
18. F. Pollock, Introduction and Notes to Sir Henry Maine's Ancient Law 424
(1906). Maine's biographer emphasizes his "Whiggish flexibility and lack of dogma-
tism" on contemporary economic questions. G. Feaver, supra note 13, at 293 n.45.
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American Law Review.' 9 Among the Club's members were Nicholas St.
John Green and Holmes.
1. The Collapse of the Old Order. - The goal of the advocates of a
new legal science was familiar: they sought to order the principles of
the common law. They also recognized, however, that the traditional
ordering schemes were no longer viable. Holmes quite explicitly
pointed out the obsolescence of the old science of procedure. "We
cannot help saying that useful as books often are which gather under a
remedy or class of remedies, such as injunction or action, the rights
which it protects," he wrote in 1871, "the day for such an arrangement
is passed."' 20 Such arrangements were useful "earlier in the history of
jurisprudence," when procedure was more highly developed than were
rules, "but now we want principles as they are related to each other, not
according to the accidental differences in the way of enforcing them." 2
1
The science of ordered principles fared no better.
The goal of earlier legal scientists like Joseph Story had been the
creation of a proper understanding of the system of law through the
intelligent application of inductive methods. Because the system that
was to be revealed had an independent existence in the very nature of
things, and because the forms of action provided a practical ordering of
legal knowledge, before the Civil War there was little explicit discussion
of how the much talked-of legal principles were to be arranged. In a
sense, the proper arrangement merely awaited revelation; legal scien-
tists did not need to construct it. There were, however, some explicit
attempts at ordering-Blackstone's broad arrangement of his lectures
around the law of persons and the law of things, itself a reflection of
Roman law ideas, was something of a paradigm, which could at least be
pointed to as an example of science. The most prevalent theme of
American descriptions of orderly science was the superiority of the clas-
sificatory scheme of the Roman law. 22 Appeals to Rome meant little,
however, to Holmes and Green.
In 1871 Holmes contributed an article to the American Law Review
on "Misunderstandings of the Civil Law."'23 He gave several examples
of the misuse of civil law concepts in the common law, including Lord
Holt's opinion in Coggs v. Bernard,24 famous for its attempt to explain
common law rules of liability in bailment in terms of Roman law princi-
ples and often regarded as a paragon of legal science. Holmes's princi-
pal point, however, was that study of the civil law had no place in the
19. G. Aichele, supra note 6, at 95.
20. Holmes, Book Notices, 5 Am. L. Rev. 534, 534-35 (1871) (reviewing A. Dicey,
A Treatise on the Rules for the Selection of the Parties to an Action (1870)).
21. Id. at 535.
22. See generally Hoeflich, Law and Geometry: Legal Science from Leibniz to
Langdell, 30 Am. J. Legal Hist. 95, 108-18 (1986) (the geometric paradigm in Anglo-
American law).
23. Holmes, Misunderstandings of the Civil Law, 6 Am. L. Rev. 37 (1871).
24. 92 Eng. Rep. 622 (1703).
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training of American lawyers because "it tends to encourage a danger-
ous reliance on what Mr. Choate would have called glittering generali-
ties" at the expense of "the exhaustive analysis of a particular case, with
which the common law begins and ends."'2 5
As early as 1869, in a review of Benjamin's treatise on the law of
sales, Holmes set forth his own vision of a proper philosophical ar-
rangement of the law. "A book of reference on any subdivision of the
law," he wrote, "must set forth at length, not only the principles con-
stituting the specific difference of the subject-matter, but also those
common to it and to many other classes of the same genus." 26 Fraud,
for instance, should be treated as an aspect of contract "or possibly
under some still wider head, rather than repeated in every text-book
dealing with every one of the different sorts of contract known to mod-
em commerce." 27
2. The Turn to Facts. - Holmes's analysis of the shortcomings of
traditional legal thought led him to the conclusion that a truly scientific
system would have to be built from the bottom up, from the cases that
give examples of the legally significant facts on which recovery is based.
The system thus created may be based on "rights," or "obligations," or
"duties," but the foundation must be factual. Holmes made this point
quite clearly in a letter to John Chipman Gray written in July of 1877.
The two friends had spent an evening discussing an article Holmes had
recently written.28 In a letter written a few days later, Holmes de-
25. Holmes, supra note 23, at 41. He made the same point several times during the
next two years, denying "that fundamental principles are more clearly brought out in
the Roman than in the English law" and emphasizing the importance of "the solution of
a particular case" to the common law. Holmes, Book Notices, 7 Am. L. Rev. 320, 320
(1873) (reviewing T.W. Greene, Outlines of Roman Law (1872)). In fact, the much
vaunted principles of the civil law are meaningless to the modem world, since they "are
obscured by traditions which prevented their consistent application, by historical diffi-
culties which have to be overcome before the law can be understood, by principles of
classification that have lost their significance, and by a philosophy which is no longer
vital." Id.
26. Holmes, Book Notices, 3 Am. L. Rev. 541, 541 (1869) (reviewingJ. Benjamin, A
Treatise on the Law of Sales of Personal Property (London 1868)) [hereinafter Holmes,
Review of Benjamin]. For similar expressions, see Holmes, Book Notice, 1 Am. L. Rev.
375-76 (1867) (reviewing D. Power, Roscoe's Digest of the Law of Evidence in Criminal
Cases (6th ed. Philadelphia 1866)); Holmes, Book Notice, 5 Am. L. Rev. 113, 113 (1870)
(reviewing J. Schouler, A Treatise on the Law of the Domestic Relations (1870));
Holmes, Codes, and the Arrangement of the Law, 5 Am. L. Rev. 1, 12-13 (1870)
(Holmes's first major article).
27. Holmes, Review of Benjamin, supra note 26, at 542.
28. Letter from Oliver Wendell Holmes to John Chipman Gray (July 13, 1877),
Oliver Wendell Holmes,Jr. Papers, box 33, folder 26, Harvard Law School Library Man-
uscript Division [hereinafter Holmes Papers], reprinted in Microfilm Edition of the
Holmes Papers, reel 53, frames 256-59 (original) (1985); id. reel 24, frames 544-45
(typed transcript). The article referred to is evidently Holmes, Primitive Notions in
Modem Law. No. II, 11 Am. L. Rev. 641 (1877) [hereinafter Holmes, Primitive Notions
in Modem Law. No. II].
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scribed to Gray "my ultimate object":
viz: to point out a distinction which is of the first importance
to a philosophical classification-which has two distinct things
to do (1) to enumerate the groups of facts which generate a
right or obligation-(2) to enumerate the facts which do not
generate either, and yet give a man the right or obligation as if
the generative fact were true.29
The facts, of course, are to be sought in the cases. As Nicholas St. John
Green wrote, dismissing John Townsend's theorizing about slander
and libel in terms of malice, "[tihe latest decided cases upon this sub-
ject make the law."
'30
Holmes seems to have first formulated his belief about the primacy
of facts in the series of lectures on jurisprudence that he gave at
Harvard College in the spring of 1872. These lectures seem, at least at
first glance, to have grown out of a rejection of Austin's ideas. The
substance of what Holmes said is preserved only in the form of a "Book
Notice" in the American Law Review, nominally a review of an article on
Austin by Frederick Pollock.31 According to Holmes, law, at least "in
the more limited meaning which lawyers give to the word," consists of
the rules enforced by the courts; such rules are not necessarily the com-
mands of the sovereign.32 Such a statement is, of course, a rejection of
one of Austin's basic premises and is, in turn, the result of a rejection of
Austin's concept of sovereignty. Holmes pointed out that the identity
of the sovereign is defined by power. "That is to say," Holmes wrote,
"the will of the sovereign is law, because he has power to compel obedi-
ence or to punish disobedience, and for no other reason."'3 3 There are,
Holmes maintained, real limits on the power of the political sovereign,
a statement he supported by showing in his lectures "that there might
be law without sovereignty, and that where there is a sovereign, prop-
erly so called, other bodies not sovereign, and even opinion, might
generate law in a philosophical sense against the will of the sover-
eign."34 He pointed out that in the end, no command of the sovereign
could prevail against the "physical power" of that "large number"
which in most states has even been a "numerical majority of males, who
have had no share in the political power."3 5
29. Letter from Oliver Wendell Holmes to John Chipman Gray (July 18, 1877),
Microfilm Edition of the Holmes Papers, supra note 28, reel 53, frames 260-61 (origi-
nal); id. reel 24, frame 546 (typed transcript).
30. Green, Slander and Libel, 6 Am. L. Rev. 593, 612 (1872) (reviewing J.
Townsend, A Treatise on the Wrongs Called Slander and Libel, and on the Remedy by
Civil Action for those Wrongs (2d ed. 1872)).
31. Holmes, Book Notices, 6 Am. L. Rev. 723 (1872) (reviewing The Law Magazine
and Review New Series No. 3 (April 1, 1872)) [hereinafter Holmes, Review of Pollock].






Once the Austinian conception of sovereignty was disposed of, it
was easy for Holmes to show that judges decide cases on many motives
"outside their own arbitrary will, beside the commands of their sover-
eign." 36 All the lawyer is concerned with, as he pointed out, is what the
judges will do in the future because "in a civilized state" what "makes
lawyers' law" is not the will of the sovereign "but what a body of sub-
jects, namely, the judges, by whom it is enforced, say is his will." 3 7 The
true subject of jurisprudence, the true source of law, therefore, is any
motive for judicial decision which lawyers can reasonably rely on to be
used by other judges in the future, which they can use to predict a fu-
ture outcome. This first appearance of Holmes's "prediction theory of
law" grew out of a belief that what judges do is the law.38 Holmes's
early work on the factual basis of law laid a solid foundation for that
belief.
II. THE CONTOURS OF HOLMES'S THOUGHT
When Holmes set out to formulate his own views on the issues that
agitated legal thinkers of his day, he drew first on history. Keeping in
mind Austin's admonitions on the source of law and Maine's use of
history to illustrate existing legal rules, Holmes searched the past for
the origins of current legal doctrine. Those origins were to be found in
the reality of the past rather than in transcendent principles that some-
how simply existed. Not surprisingly, he took an increasingly empirical
view of law, grounding legal science in the facts of human life, among
which were judicial decisions. His view was shared by the first genera-
tion of modem law teachers and in this respect, contrary to what many
have assumed, Holmes and Langdell were more intellectual allies than
enemies.
A. The Role of History
By the spring of 1872, then, Holmes seems to have made a public
repudiation of total faith in Austin. He continued for the next year or
so in the Austinian task of classification, albeit on the basis of duties.
After the publication of "The Theory of Torts" in 1873,39 however, the
charts showing the arrangements of the duties disappeared. His next
article, "Primitive Notions in Modem Law" published in 1876, marks
an important transition. 40 In that essay Holmes carried forward the
aim of "The Theory of Torts" to show that liability for tortious acts
does not depend on culpability, as Austin maintained, but rather on the
failure to come up to the standard of behavior established by the com-
36. Id. at 724.
37. Id.
38. Id.
39. Holmes, Theory of Torts, 7 Am. L. Rev. 652 (1873).
40. Holmes, Primitive Notions in Modem Law, 10 Am. L. Rev. 422 (1876).
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munity. His methodology was historical. He pointed out that at least
in some cases "which Austin, following the jurists of the mature period
of Roman law, had interpreted on grounds of culpability," the root of
liability was in fact "the much more primitive notion, that liability at-
tached directly to the thing doing the damage. '41 He attempted to
"explain that primitive notion more at length, to show its influence on
the body of modem law, and to trace the development from it of a large
number of doctrines which in their actual form seem most remote from
each other or from any common source."
'42
Holmes's next article, "Primitive Notions in Modern Law. No. II,"
appeared in July of 1877.4 3 Its purpose was "to prove the historical
truth of a general result, arrived at analytically" in "The Arrangement
of the Law."' 44 Holmes's earlier article rested on his belief, which had
formed for some time an important part of his view of law, that "all
special rights are legal consequences of a special group of facts."
'45
Supporting that belief required Holmes to explain why some "continu-
ing rights [which] are incidents to a situation of fact, [and] which can
only be filled by the first person entitled to the rights in question," can
"be succeeded to by another who cannot fill the situation."'46 The con-
ventional description of this situation uses the notion of "privity" to
explain the relationship between the first holder of the right and his
successor. In "The Arrangement of the Law" he analyzed the concept
of privity in terms of an abstract persona that is the thing to which the
fact situation attaches, an idea that in turn is traced to the treatment of
heirship in the Roman law.47 He came to the conclusion, as he put it in
"Primitive Notions in Modern Law. No. II" "that in such cases there is
a fictitious identification of distinct persons for the purpose of transfer-
ring or completing the right."'48 That article found the origin of that
fictitious identification in an analogy to inheritance. Thus Holmes
could explain the seemingly anomalous situation he described at the
beginning of the essay. If a person uses a way over his neighbor's prop-
erty in order to reach his own, the person who buys the land and con-
tinues to use the way "can add the seller's time of adverse user to his
own, for the purpose of making out an enjoyment long enough to give
him a right by prescription. ' 49 Someone not a buyer (one who has un-
41. Id. at 423. Holmes's first criticized Austin's conception of culpability in
Holmes, Review of Pollock, supra note 31, at 725.
42. Holmes, supra note 40, at 423.
43. Holmes, Primitive Notions in Modem Law. No. II, supra note 28.
44. Id. at 641. The article referred to was Holmes, The Arrangement of the Law:
Privity, 7 Am. L. Rev. 46 (1873) [hereinafter Holmes, Arrangement of the Law].
45. Holmes, Primitive Notions in Modem Law. No. II, supra note 28, at 641 (sum-
marizing his earlier article on Arrangement of the Law).
46. Holmes, Arrangement of the Law, supra note 44, at 49.
47. Id. passim.
48. Holmes, Primitive Notions in Modem Law. No. II, supra note 28, at 641.
49. Id. at 641-42.
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lawfully dispossessed (disseised) the original adverse user), however,
cannot add (tack) his period of use to that of his predecessor. The idea
of tacking arose from analogizing the purchaser to the heir who suc-
ceeds to all the rights of the deceased by assuming his persona; he is not
in the eyes of the law a different person. Since heirship is always lawful
or right, the analogy cannot be applicable to a disseisor. Holmes traces
the use of this analogy through Roman, Germanic and English law.50
Holmes still faced a legal puzzle, however. The lack of privity be-
tween disseisee and disseisor arose from the apparent unwillingness to
conceive of a "wrongful" succession by inheritance, or as Holmes put
it, "without the element of consent, there was no likeness to be laid
hold of."5 1 In spite of this limit to the analogy, it seems that at com-
mon law, although the matter is not without doubt, a disseisor does
have an action against anyone who obstructs a right of way over an-
other's land (an easement) obtained by the disseisee through adverse
use. The puzzle is compounded by the undoubted legal fact that an
easement is incapable of possession, being "an ideal creation of the
law."152 The answer is found, Holmes believed, in the tendency, com-
mon in one period of the development of the human mind, to endow
inanimate things with a personality, a concept he had already discussed
in his earlier article on "Primitive Notions in Modem Law."'55 Rights
obtained by prescription were "built up out of similes drawn from legal
persons" at the time when personification was still common in criminal
law, "and then, as often happens, language reacted on thought, so that
conclusions were drawn as to the rights themselves from the terms in
which they happened to be expressed." 54 Again Holmes traces this
idea through Roman and English writers and uses it to explain one of
the knotty concepts of the land law, the rule that privity of estate is
necessary in order for a covenant to run with the land. 55
It is important that the difference between the historical method of
these later articles and the analytical method of the earlier be under-
stood. In the earlier article on arrangement of the law, Holmes at-
tempted to explain the problem of succession by showing that the
notion of privity logically arose from the fictitious identification of de-
cedent and heir. In the later articles he shows through the examination
of legal thought of treatise writers how the fictitious identification was
extended to other areas by analogy. This process was governed by
ideas like the personification of inanimate objects, which his age did not
accept and which are emphatically not logical. In these later works,
Holmes is writing a sort of intellectual history that attempts to ground
50. Id. at 643-53.
51. Id. at 647.
52. Id. at 654.
53. Holmes, supra note 40, at 423.
54. Holmes, Primitive Notions in Modem Law. No. II, supra note 28, at 654-55.
55. Id. at 656-60.
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legal ideas in the more general ideas of a specific historical era as well
as in the operation of the human mind. Thus the difference between
the treatment of easements and covenants cannot be explained by clas-
sifying them as rights in rem or obligations, or by differentiating be-
tween rights obtained by grant and those obtained by prescription. An
accurate explanation requires an understanding of the intellectual (but
not necessarily rational) processes that clothed an estate with some-
thing akin to personality. 56
Holmes is not concerned, however, with testing his hypothesis
against evidence other than that provided in commentaries and trea-
tises. Regarding his conclusion that easements and like concepts were
seen as part of the land itself, he wrote:
If evidence of a general tendency, in the early communities
and manors, to impress a permanent character on particular
parcels of land, or that services were due from or to their re-
spective occupants simply by reason of their occupation, were
necessary for the present argument, it would probably not be
hard to find. But there is no need of going into further
details.57
He did, however, add to this passage a footnote citing the work of the
French scholar M.E. de Laveleye and his own lengthy footnote to
Kent's discussion of the history of alienation in his edition of Kent's
Commentaries on American Law.58 The footnote is an elaborate discussion
of what historical evidence Holmes could find, much of it in secondary
sources, about the origins of property and the nature of village commu-
nities. He was not disdainful of the facts of social history, but the focus
of his inquiry was ideas.
Holmes's thought continued in the empirical channel, as evidenced
by his increasing concern with history. He published his next article,
"Possession," in July of 1878.59 It is most important for its expression
of Holmes's notion about the relationship between facts and law and its
rejection of a priori approaches to the law. In the second division of
the article Holmes deals explicitly with the question, which, he points
out, has been the focus of German scholarship on this subject,
"whether possession is a fact or a right?" 60 The question, in Holmes's
view, should never have been asked, at least by lawyers who are not
concerned with what philosophers or moralists mean by the question.
Every right "is a consequence attached by the law to a group of facts
which the law defines."' 1 If the facts exist with regard to a certain per-
56. Id. at 657-58.
57. Id. at 657 (footnote omitted).
58. 4J. Kent, Commentaries on American Law 441-42 n.1 (O.W. Holmes 12th ed.
Boston 1873). Several articles by Laveleye are referred to in footnote one, as is
Holmes's "Arrangement of the Law." Id.
59. Holmes, Possession, 12 Am. L. Rev. 688 (1878).




son, that person has the right in question. Possession, therefore, "is
such a group of facts; and, when we say of a man that he has possession,
we mean to affirm directly that all the facts of that group are true of
him, and we convey, indirectly or by implication, that the law will give
him the advantages of the situation. ' 62
The importance of this definition, which Holmes believed is true
for every substantive area of the law, becomes evident when he con-
trasts it to German ideas about possession. According to Holmes, all
the best known German jurists are both scholars of the Roman law and
disciples of some version of Kantian or post-Kantian philosophy.63
Roman possession was "that of an owner or of one on his way to be-
come owner." 64 Savigny took this fact of Roman law to the conclusion
that "intent to deal with the thing as owner, is in general necessary to
turn a mere physical detention into juridical possession." 65 This view
in turn harmonizes with Kant's view of law. For him, possession was
part of the ego, a manifestation of the will which can only be restrained
when it interferes with the freedom of others. The intent necessary for
possession, therefore, must be an intent to make oneself owner.66 This
intent should be protected because the entire legal system must respect
the manifestations of the human will.6 7 Holmes had already shown in
the first part of the essay, however, that the common law gives posses-
sory remedies to persons who are not owners.
68
Holmes's entire view of the law becomes clear in his explanation of
the inadequacies of the German position and the rightness of the com-
mon law approach. First, he reiterates the idea that legal duties come
before legal rights. He makes explicit his view that "the direct opera-
tion of the law is to limit freedom of action or choice on the part of a
greater or less number of persons in certain specified ways; while the
fact that the power of removing or enforcing this limitation is generally
confided to certain other private persons is not a necessary or universal
correlative."'69 In other words, the law prevents people from interfer-
ing with other people. In fact, the law does this directly in the case of
the protection of possession. The intent which must be found in order
to protect possession is the intent not to make oneself owner, but to
exclude othersJ
0
Holmes then demonstrates through the analysis of cases that the
common law protects as possessors those who have the intent to ex-
62. Id.
63. Id. at 700.
64. Id. at 701.
65. Id.
66. Id. at 700-01.
67. Id. at 717.
68. Id. at 696-98.




dude others. He admits that his proposed general test of intent does
not fit the case of servants who are considered not to have possession of
property entrusted to them although it is true that a servant clearly in-
tends to exclude the world at large. The reconciliation is found in his-
tory. "A servant is denied possession," Holmes asserted, "not from
any peculiarity of intent with regard to the things in his custody either
towards his master or other people by which he is distinguished from a
depositary, but simply as one of the incidents of his status." 71 The sta-
tus still bears many of the marks of its origin in slavery and the posses-
sion of a slave was the possession of the owner. Here again history
gives an answer which logic cannot. As Holmes put it, "there is no
adequate and complete explanation of the modern law, except by the
survival in practice of rules which lost their true meaning when the ob-
jects of them ceased to be slaves." 72 Just as the rules regarding ease-
ments and covenants are explained not by the concept of privity but by
the operation of analogy and the survival of the idea of personification
of objects, so the inability of servants to have possession is understand-
able only by understanding history.
Holmes was not quite done. He maintained not only that the com-
mon law actually required that the possessor have the intent to exclude
but that "no more should be required on principle."' "3 Possession is
protected not for the philosophical reasons of the Germans regarding
the will and personality, but because "man, by an instinct which he
.shares with the domestic dog, and of which the seal gives a most strik-
ing example, will not allow himself to be dispossessed, either by force
or fraud, of what he holds, without trying to get it back again."'74 The
grounds of this part of the common law are, therefore, empirical. "In-
deed, those who see in the history of law the formal expression of the
development of society will be apt to think that the proximate ground
of law must be empirical, even when that ground is the fact that a cer-
tain ideal or theory of government is generally entertained. ' 75
In "Possession," for the first time, all of the themes of Holmes's
thought are brought together into one argument. First, the definition
of law as the application of force on individuals is expressed as the
source of the primacy given to duties. Second, the object of the study
of law is the facts which must be true in order for the law to act. Third,
no matter what sort of conclusions about general rules and principles
can be drawn from the exploration of the facts that invoke the public
power (an investigation which is itself historical, based on the records
of the law), perfect symmetry can never be expected because the work-
ings of the human mind in history are not perfectly logical. Reasons for
71. Id. at 707.
72. Id. at 710.
73. Id. at 702.




rules have disappeared, yet the effects of the rules persist. Finally, the
study of the law is not concerned with philosophical systems, but rather
with the realities of life in the world, which realities are not particularly
lofty. Possession is protected because man-like other animals-de-
fends what he has acquired.
B. Empirical Law
The state of Holmes's thought at the time of the publication of
"Possession" seems settled enough to attempt to assess the influence
of the two major groups of ideas that dominated American legal
thought in the period: the analytical and historical approaches to juris-
prudence. In the first place, Holmes was critical of Austin. The defini-
tion of law as the command of a sovereign simply did not convince
Holmes. He saw too many instances of the sovereign being powerless
to make law in the face of power held by others, that "numerical major-
ity of males" 76 who in the extreme could undo the sovereign's law by
taking to the streets. What should not be overlooked, however, is that
for all his criticism of Austin, Holmes still finds the source of law in the
facts of power. 77 The complaint of some anti-Austinians was that the
command theory promoted the unacceptable notion that the legislature
could make any law it wanted, even if that law interfered with property
rights in an effort to effect the redistribution of wealth, an aim which
was totally contrary to the true nature of law, the rights of property
being above and beyond human meddling. Holmes shared no such be-
lief. What the public power enforces is the law. Given Holmes's belief
about the instinct to preserve one's property, he might find something
short of naked confiscation unwise, but it seems unlikely that he would
say that something inherent in the nature of law deprived the legisla-
ture of such power. He came close to saying that might makes, if not
right, at least law of the kind lawyers must study. Rejection of Austin's
conception of the absolute nature of the sovereign's power does not
entail, at least for Holmes, a rejection of the basic idea of the nature of
law which Austin expressed.
78
Nor did Holmes's abandonment of the attempt to classify the law
on the basis of duties signify a complete rejection of Austin. In "Pos-
session" he wrote: "The business of the jurist is to make known the
content of the law; that is, to work upon it from within, or logically,
arranging and distributing it in order from its summum genus to its infima
species." 79 Holmes repeated this passage almost verbatim in The Common
76. Holmes, Review of Pollock, supra note 31, at 723.
77. See R. Cosgrove, Our Lady the Common Law: An Anglo-American Legal
Community, 1870-1930, at 113-14 (1987).
78. See H. Pohlman, Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes and Utilitarian Jurisprudence
48-75 (1984).
79. Holmes, supra note 59, at 702.
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Law, adding the words "so far as practicable" at the end.80 This qualifi-
cation of the need to classify symbolizes exactly to what extent Holmes
rejected Austin's thought. His abandonment of the attempt to classify
or arrange the law according to a schedule of duties marked the end of
his engagement with "Austin's classificatory mania." 8' The passage
from "Possession" reproduced in The Common Law is the only discus-
sion of legal duties in the book. By 1883 Holmes had come to doubt
whether there was any use in the concepts of rights and duties. "The
primary duty," he wrote Pollock, "is little more than a convenient index
to, or mode of predicting the point of incidence of the public force."'8
2
More than thirty years later Holmes wrote to John Chipman Gray in
answer to Gray's inquiry about "an article of yours, I think in the Am.
[sic] Law Review to the effect that the best classification of the Law was
on duties."'8 3 Holmes replied:
The duty basis was the theme of my first article in the law Rev.
Oct. 1870-Vol. 5 p. 1. "A long time ago, gentlemen," as old
Parsons used to say in a melancholy voice, "a very long time
ago." Later I became convinced that the machinery of rights
and duties was a fifth wheel-and partially expressed it in an
address to the Boston Law School Jan 8/97 ["The Path of the
Law"] that was printed in the Harv. Law Rev. My theme and
present view is expressed in American Banana Co. v. United
Fruit Co. 213 U.S. 347, 356 [1908] "Law is a statement of the
circumstance in which the public force will be brought to bear
upon men through the Courts."
'8 4
Five years earlier, Holmes had been even more blunt in a letter to Gray
on the same topic: "Personally I don't care a damn for the rights and
duties business preferring to regard only the prophecy as to the inci-
dence of the public force" as he discussed in "The Path of the Law." 8 5
The evolution of Holmes's ideas about torts further illustrates his
growing disillusionment with the concept of duties as well as with his
prior adherence to Austinian ideas. In "The Theory of Torts,"8 6
Holmes had put forward the idea that negligence is a question of fact,
asking whether or not an actor has lived up to what the average mem-
80. O.W. Holmes, supra note 1, at 219.
81. R. Cosgrove, supra note 77, at 113.
82. Letter from Oliver Wendell Holmes to Frederick Pollock (Mar. 25, 1883), re-
printed in 1 Holmes-Pollock Letters: The Correspondence of Mr. Justice Holmes and
Sir Frederick Pollock, 1874-1932, at 20-21 (M. Howe ed. 2d ed. 1961) [hereinafter
Holmes-Pollock Letters].
83. Letter fromJohn Chipman Gray to Oliver Wendell Holmes (undated), Holmes
Papers, supra note 28, box 33, folder 23.
84. Letter from Oliver Wendell Holmes to John Chipman Gray (Oct. 27, 1914),
Holmes Papers, supra note 28, box 33, folder 26.
85. Letter from Oliver Wendell Holmes to John Chipman Gray (Nov. 3, 1909),
Holmes Papers, supra note 28, box 33, folder 26. The article referred to is Holmes, The
Path of the Law, 10 Harv. L. Rev. 457 (1897).
86. Holmes, supra note 39.
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ber of the community would do in the circumstances. This view rests
all negligence law on facts which are to be investigated through the
means of decided cases. As Holmes put it, "an enumeration of the ac-
tions which have been successful, and of those which have failed, de-
fines the extent of the primary duties imposed by the law .... ,,s7 He
then proceeded to classify the law of torts according to duties by relat-
ing subjects of the substantive law to duties depending on the facts in-
volved.88 To remove the duties from the scheme leaves legal
categories and facts, the only subjects he has discussed based on evi-
dence of what courts really do. Duties truly are a "fifth wheel."
Holmes's modifications of Austin's ideas are, therefore, an exten-
sion of the empirical side of Austin's thought. If Austin's conception of
law was based on the reality of power, his scheme for the classification
and arrangement of legal ideas nevertheless partook of more abstrac-
tion than Holmes was willing to accept. One of the strains of thought
which led Holmes to his position was his appreciation of history.
Holmes's view of the sovereign was based on what history showed to be
the limits of the political sovereign's power.89 His conception of the
non-logical side of the law was grounded on an understanding of the
extent to which ideas and, in some cases, institutions long without any
real life in contemporary thought still exercised influence through the
existence of rules based on them.
The realization that Holmes was a historian of ideas sheds light on
his treatment of the role of morality in law. Like Austin, Holmes be-
lieved that for purposes of study, law and morals must be separated.
Holmes had made the point in print quite early. In 1867 he reviewed
the ninth edition of Story's Equity Jurisprudence by Issac Redfield,90 for-
mer chief justice of Vermont, whose eulogist had praised him as an
ideal lawyer always concerned with sound principles and the morality of
the law.9 t The young Holmes saw matters differently. Although Red-
field was "an eminent and able man," 92 his editing of Story exhibited
the same flaws all of his works did. "One of them," Holmes wrote, "is a
habit of moralizing, which is notably out of place among the rules and
precedents of courts." 93 He then quoted Redfield's criticism of an
English judge for doing justice rather than adhering to principle, some-
thing always to be deprecated by those who believe in principle and
87. Id. at 659-60 (footnote ommitted).
88. Id. at 660-63.
89. For a discussion of the relationship between Austin's, Maine's and Holmes's
ideas of sovereignty, see H. Pohlman, supra note 78, at 54-66.
90. Holmes, Book Notices, 1 Am. L. Rev. 554 (1867) (reviewing Story, Commenta-
ries on Equity Jurisprudence (I. Redfield 9th ed. (1866)).
91. Phelps, Issac F. Redfield, in Orations & Essays of Edward John Phelps, Diplo-
mat and Statesman 222-23 (J.G. McCullough ed. 1901).




trust " 'consequences to Him with whom are all the issues of life.'-"4
Holmes's comment on that statement clearly ruled morality out of
court: "When the learned editor calls in the authority of religion to
make weight against the authority of the Master of the Rolls, by doing
so he only renders the want of legal authority more conspicuous." 9 5 In
"Possession" he was more explicit:
We may leave on one side the question of their [legal rights']
relation to moral rights, and whether moral rights are not in
like manner logically the offspring of moral duties; these are
for the philosopher who approaches the law from without, as
part of a larger series of human manifestations. The business
of the jurist is to make known the content of the law .... 96
Morality did not decide cases. It did, however, have a role to play
in the growth of the law. Holmes explained that role in a passage near
the end of the chapter in The Common Law on "The Theory of Torts":
But in the main the law started from those intentional wrongs
which are the simplest and most pronounced cases, as well as
the nearest to the feeling of revenge which leads to self-re-
dress. It thus naturally adopted the vocabulary, and in some
degree the tests, of morals. But as the law has grown, even
when its standards have continued to model themselves upon
those of morality, they have necessarily become external, be-
cause they have considered, not the actual condition of the
particular defendant, but whether his conduct would have
been wrong in the fair average member of the community,
whom he is expected to equal at his peril. 97
Ideas of morality are one more component in the intellectual history of
the law. It must be taken into account in describing law's growth and
even its current state. The notion of the average member of the com-
munity is at least in part shaped by community ideas of right and
wrong. The tests of the law, however, do not address the moral state of
the actor and moral standards have no inherent authority apart from
their use to help set the objective legal test.98
C. Holmes and Legal Education
Since the ultimate basis of the sort of systematic legal science
sought by Green and Holmes was the decided case, they might be as-
sumed to be advocates and allies of the transformation that was occur-
ring at Harvard Law School at the very time they were formulating the
94. Id.
95. Id.
96. Holmes, supra note 59, at 702.
97. O.W. Holmes, supra note 1, at 161-62. See also Holmes's discussion of fraud,
in which he states that "the moral starting-point of liability in general should never be
forgotten." Id. at 137.
98. On Holmes's rejection of the authority of morals apart from their acceptance by
a majority, see R. Cosgrove, supra note 77, at 117-18.
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ideas examined above. Indeed, Green, Holmes and Gray occupied lec-
tureships in Cambridge during this period. Green, however, left the
reforming Harvard to help found the new law school at Boston Univer-
sity in protest against the new methods. Holmes wrote critical reviews
of Langdell's work in the years before publication of The Common Law,
and the intellectual relationship between Holmes and the dean has be-
come a controverted point.99 Saul Touster has maintained that Holmes
moved from criticism of Langdell's reliance on cases to acceptance of
the case method, a transformation which led Holmes in The Common
Law to ignore "moral ideas" and "philosophy" in favor of a narrow,
formalistic approach to law.100 Like most assertions of a'basic transfor-
mation in Holmes's thought, Langdell's assumed influence, exerted
through his teaching technique, is misconstrued. Holmes quarreled
with the dean, but their differences have obscured important areas of
agreement.
Holmes was the author of the highly critical notice of the Harvard
Law School which appeared in the American Law Review in 1870.101 He
found the school inadequate in almost every particular. He seems to
have been soured on law schools by his experience at the unreformed
Harvard. The next year, in reviewing Bryce's urgings that common
lawyers study the civil law, Holmes observed that "[t]he common law
begins and ends with the solution of a particular case," and that "the
best training," therefore, "is found in our moot courts and the offices
of older lawyers."' 0 2 The implication is that the best learning comes by
doing, a belief perfectly compatible with the ideas about education that
accompanied the introduction of the case method to the law school.'
03
In the first years of the new regime at Harvard, the case method
was used exclusively by Langdell and was known to the outside world
through his casebooks. Holmes's review of the first part of Langdell's
contracts casebook was full of praise for its historical arrangement.
"Tracing the growth of a doctrine in this way," Holmes wrote, "not
99. See, e.g., Book Notice, 14 Am. L. Rev. 233, 234 (1880) (reviewing C. Langdell,
A Selection of Cases on the Law of Contracts, with a Summary of the Topics Covered by
the Cases (2d ed. 1879)) [hereinafter Holmes, 1880 Review of Langdell]. The involved
story of the attribution of the review to Holmes is told in Touster, Holmes a Hundred
Years Ago. The Common Law and Legal Theory, 10 Hofstra L. Rev. 673, 695 n.91 (1982).
The link between Holmes and Langdell was most clearly made by Grant Gilmore. See
G. Gilmore, supra note 7, at 48-56; G. Gilmore, The Death of Contract 14-22, 35-43
(1974). For a critical assessment of recent Holmes scholarship, including observations
on the connection between Holmes and Langdell, see H. Pohlman, supra note 78, at
144-64.
100. See Touster, supra note 99, at 694-704.
101. Holmes, Harvard University, Law School, 5 Am. L. Rev. 177 (1870).
102. Holmes, Book Notice, 5 Am. L. Rev. 715, 716 (1871) (reviewingJ. Bryce, The
Academical Study of the Civil Law (1871)).
103. See Chase, The Birth of the Modem Law School, 23 Am. J. Legal Hist. 329,
329-48 (1979); Chase, Origins of Modern Professional Education: The Harvard Case
Method Conceived as Clinical Instruction in Law, 5 Nova LJ. 323, 323-40 (1981).
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only fixes it in the mind, but shows its meaning, extent, and limits as
nothing else can." 10 4 Holmes went on, however, to criticize Langdell's
treatment of the cases on forbearance as "collected with an over-
scrupulous minuteness." Langdell, it seems, had paid too much atten-
tion "to the other side of what is now settled."' 0 5 This failing did not,
however, detract from the usefulness of the work.10 6 The publication
of the complete work later in 1871 was greeted by another anonymous
Holmes review that praised the dean for using a philosophical rather
than a manual method of arrangement and that also pointed out the
importance of the principles to be deduced from the cases, at least for
the instruction of students.10 7 While Langdell's innovation was still
new, Holmes had some reservations about Langdell's scholarship.
Holmes approved the study of cases as the source of the law-as a place
where the principles are found-but found Langdell's practice of the
study defective.
Holmes expressed these same attitudes much more fully in his re-
view of the second edition of the contracts casebook published in 1879.
In this review Holmes characterized the dean as "perhaps, the greatest
living legal theologian," concerned only with "the formal connection of
things, or logic, as distinguished from the feelings which make the con-
tent of logic, and which have actually shaped the substance of the
law."' 08 What those "feelings" are is most simply said to be the lessons
of history of the sort Holmes dealt with in his contemporaneous writ-
ings. The core of Holmes's criticism, however, is the same point he
made in his first review of Langdell's work. The tendency to "over-
scrupulous minuteness" seen in 1871 had blossomed into the dogma-
tism-"the effort to reduce the concrete details of an existing system to
the merely logical consequence of simple postulates"-seen in the ex-
tensive summary of the law of contracts which Langdell added to the
second edition of the casebook.109 Having published his idea of a com-
plete system for the first time, clearly Langdell was determined to prove
his point even if that meant reconciling decisions "which those who
gave them meant to be opposed" by drawing them together "by subtle
lines which never were dreamed of before Mr. Langdell wrote." 0
Holmes specifically disagreed with Langdell on the notion of
equivalency, a concept involved in understanding the role of considera-
tion in bilateral contracts. Broadly put, Langdell's observation was that
104. Holmes, Book Notice, 5 Am. L. Rev. 539, 540 (1871) (reviewing C. Langdell,




107. See Holmes, Book Notice, 6 Am. L. Rev. 353, 353-54 (1872) (reviewing C.
Langdell, A Selection of Cases on the Law of Contracts (1871)).
108. Holmes, 1880 Review of Langdell, supra note 99, at 233.
109. Id. at 234.
110. Id. at 233.
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in the case of a contract made by giving a promise for a promise, the
performance of one is payment for the performance of the other and
therefore, as Holmes put it, neither party "can call on the other to per-
form without being ready at the same time himself.""' This becomes
in turn an important principle for understanding the role of conditions
in contract law. Holmes, however, did not believe that the proper judi-
cial treatment of conditions depended on the working out of a principle
of equivalence.
Suppose A promises B to do a day's work for two dollars, and
B promises A to pay two dollars for a day's work. There the
two promises cannot be performed at the same time. The
work will take all day, the payment half a minute. How are you
to decide which is to be done first, that is to say, which prom-
ise is dependent upon performance on the other side? It is
only by reference to the habits of the community and to
convenience. 
1 12
Theory, the idea that "on the principle of equivalency a man is not pre-
sumed to intend to pay for a thing until he has it," 1 is not sufficient to
answer the question. The work is payment for the money and the
money for the work. There is no reason in logic to say one person
"intends" to pay before he has what he has bought and the other in-
tends to give before he has been paid. What does give the answer, what
explains the cases, is that amalgam of practice and belief which is
summed up in history and which is the law.
The fact that employers, as a class, can be trusted for wages
more safely than the employed for their labor, that the em-
ployers have had the power and have been the law-makers, or
other considerations, it matters not what, have determined
that the work is to be done first. But the grounds of decision
are purely practical, and can never be elicited from grammar
or from logic. 11
4
Holmes's fourth sentence of The Common Law was the same sen-
tence he had used in the review which described Langdell as a "legal
theologian": "The life of the law has not been logic: it has been expe-
rience." 115 Langdell's system was too logical, too devoted to drawing
distinctions and reconciling cases on grounds that had life only in his
own mind. Holmes felt himself to be firmly grounded in the reality of
history, human nature and the practicalities of life in the world. The
heart of Holmes's criticism is an objection to Langdell's intellectual ri-
gidity and a priori approach, to his creation of what Pollock called "the
Langdellian ether of a super-terrestrial Common Law where authority
does not count at all," not to the study of the law through the study of
111. O.W. Holmes, supra note 1, at 335.
112. Id. at 337.
113. Id.
114. Id. at 338.
115. Id. at 1; Holmes, 1880 Review of Langdell, supra note 99, at 234.
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cases. 116
Perhaps the most dramatic example of the basic agreement be-
tween the two men can be seen in a letter Langdell wrote to Theodore
Dwight Woolsey of Yale soon after assuming the deanship discussing
the study of jurisprudence. The new dean had been appointed secre-
tary of a "Committee on Jurisprudence" which appears to have been
the relevant committee of the American Social Science Association. He
does not appear to have been particularly honored by the appointment
and wrote Woolsey to profess his bewilderment at exactly what he was
expected to do as well as "to offer for your consideration the following
suggestions in regard to the study of jurisprudence":
[I]t [the study of jurisprudence] does not specially concern
lawyers or those intending to become lawyers, but other por-
tions of the community as well; some perhaps more, e.g.,
those aiming at public life or a high order ofjournalism. The
chief business of a lawyer is and must be to learn and adminis-
ter the law as it is; while I suppose the great object in studying
jurisprudence should be to ascertain what the law ought to be;
and although these two pursuits may seem to be of a very kin-
dred nature, I think experience shews that devotion to one is
apt to give more or less distaste for the other."
17
In fact, the study of jurisprudence does not even belong in the law
schools, but rather should be part of the postgraduate studies available
in the university and should be carried on by "University men who
devote themselves to the higher education, and not lawyers, whether on
or off the Bench, not even professors in Law Schools." 1 8 Like
Holmes, Langdell shared the Austinian belief in the separation of the is
and the ought. All that there is of law is in the cases. Anything else is
the province of another field of study.
D. Holmes and the Scholarly Tradition
If this explication of Holmes's thought through the period ending
with the publication of The Common Law is correct, it is necessary to
reassess claims that Holmes was startlingly original in his thought and
that his ideas underwent a far reaching transformation during his long
career. Indeed, it seems that Holmes shared in widely held beliefs
about the nature of law and about the way to go about studying it.
Commentators have identified as his most notable contributions
ideas-such as the prediction theory, the "bad man" view of law, and
the separation of law and morality-which were firmly rooted in the
116. Letter from Fredrick Pollock to Oliver Wendell Holmes (Sept. 17, 1897), in 1
Holmes-Pollock Letters, supra note 82, at 80.
117. Letter from Christopher C. Langdell to Theodore D. Woolsey (Feb. 6, 1871)





advanced legal culture of his younger years and which he himself held
from the 1870s. 19 In particular, "The Path of the Law" represents not
a new start or even a turning point, but the making explicit of his em-
pirical approach to law and the emphasis on law as a coercive mecha-
nism which he first described in his earliest articles. Even the aspects of
his thought that have caused revulsion in the present day were a part of
the legal culture in which he came to intellectual maturity.
Holmes's scorn for the mob, his almost cynical treatment of the
democratic process has been much noted in recent scholarship. Grant
Gilmore in particular found Holmes "savage, harsh, and cruel, a bitter
and lifelong pessimist."' 120 Most commentators seem to explain this as-
pect of Holmes by pointing to the influence of "social Darwinism,"
which was heightened by Holmes's experiences as a soldier.' 2 ' Distrust
of democracy, however, was a common theme in Anglo-American legal
thought throughout the mid- and late-nineteenth century. Austin him-
self was appalled by the progressive extension of Parliamentary suf-
frage.' 22 Maine was no happier with political developments that
extended the power of the "people" in politics. 123 Holmes's friend,
James Fitzjames Stephen, was perhaps the most prominent an-
tidemocrat of the Victorian age. His Liberty, Equality, Fraternity 124 was a
withering attack on the premises of democracy. Stephen's basic asser-
tion was that the vast majority of people were ignorant and vicious and
dedicated to levelling society through the destruction of private
property. 125
The ignorance of which these thinkers complained was ignorance
of the "truths" of classical political economy. In a sense, Adam Smith
and Malthus were their guiding lights. 126 Holmes was one of the true
believers. He found socialism stupid because it ignored economic
truth. Indeed, he wrote to Pollock that rereading Malthus pleased him
"immensely" but left him "sad." "A hundred years ago he busted falla-
cies that politicians and labor leaders still live on. One thinks that an
error exposed is dead, but exposure amounts to nothing when people
want to believe."' 27 Holmes's belief in life as struggle, therefore, had
at least some of its roots in an adherence to the tenets of classical lib-
eral economics widely shared by his contemporaries. Unlike some of
119. See, e.g., G. Aichele, supra note 6, at 124-62.
120. G. Gilmore, supra note 7, at 48-49.
121. See Aichele, supra note 6, at 61, 144.
122. See W. Rumble, supra note 10, at 196-205.
123. See R. Cocks, supra note 13, at 131-40.
124. J. Stephen, Liberty, Equality, Fraternity (1873).
125. See B. Mylchreest, The Anglo-American Dialogue on Constitutionalism,
1860-1920, at 215-19 (1988) (unpublished dissertation available at Cornell University).
126. See B. Mylchreest, supra note 125, at 115, 216-19; W. Rumble, supra note 10,
at 201.
127. 1 Holmes-Pollock Letters, supra note 82, at 219; see also G. Aichele, supra
note 6, at 149; B. Mylchreest, supra note 125, at 218.
1990]
COLUMBIA LA W REVIEW
those contemporaries, however, he also believed that Austin's basic in-
sight into law as power meant that he could not enforce those tenets on
an unwilling polity. Holmes's early adherence to Austinian positivism
is thus the direct ancestor of his judicial dismissal of freedom of con-
tract as "an economic theory which a large part of the country does not
entertain" in his dissent in Lochner v. New York in 1905.128
CONCLUSION
Holmes began his legal career as a student of the two dominant
strains of the legal culture of the time. Drawing from both the analyti-
cal and the historical schools, he attempted to create a science of law
that would supersede the previous generation's belief in an ordered
system of a priori principles. By separating law and morality, as Austin
counselled, Holmes believed he could free the study of law from irrele-
vant considerations of what should or must be in favor of an empirical
study of what the law really is. By studying history, Holmes believed he
could demonstrate that legal doctrine did not develop according to log-
ical rules, but rather reflected a society's social structure as well as its
conscious judgments about policy.
Holmes had definite beliefs about how those policy decisions
should be made. His policy preferences were based on classical liberal
economics. When it came to judging, however, Holmes's beliefs about
the nature of law proved stronger than his economic views. Having
located the source of law in power, he refrained as ajudge from oppos-
ing what he saw as expressions of society's will, even when those ex-
pressions were, in his eyes, stupid. As it happened, his restraint led to a
reluctance to invalidate progressive legislation. Thus, with some care-
ful editing of the record, he could be lionized as a "liberal" even
though he was "liberal" only in the nineteenth century sense of that
term. His disregard for individual rights, 129 except perhaps in the area
of political speech, offends contemporary liberal ideas, but was at its
base simply a reflection of his deference to the power of the majority.
His scorn of the mob, and perhaps of the very idea of democracy, was a
common posture among nineteenth century Anglo-American legal
thinkers.
The connections between Holmes and other students of the com-
mon law have been neglected, in part because the Justice outlived them
all. °3 0 Towards the end of his life, admirers half his age transformed
him into a paragon of liberal virtue. The rediscovery of his true views
has led to studies which concentrate on the man himself rather than on
the legal culture in which he came to intellectual maturity. When those
128. 198 U.S. 45, 75 (1905) (Holmes, J., dissenting).
129. See G. Aichele, supra note 6, at 148-49.
130. Three exceptions to this neglect are R. Cosgrove, supra note 77; B.
Mylchreest, supra note 125; H. Pohlman, supra note 78.
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connections are reexamined, Holmes can be seen as a part of his times,
as one of several Victorian legal thinkers, most of whom simply did not
manage to hold an important judicial post well into the twentieth
century.
This reexamination also reveals a final irony, one -that Holmes
might have appreciated. He once wrote that his epitaph should read
"Here lies the supple tool of power." 131 Perhaps he should have said,
"Here lies the supple tool of law professors." The legal realists seized
him as their patron saint, the one true mature judge who had overcome
formalism. Yet in his thought he did adhere to a formalism of a sort; he
believed that the laws of the dismal science were true and inescapable.
If he is the ancestor of any branch of current American legal thought,
those who should erect his shrine are the advocates of law and econom-
ics. In Holmes they can find a thinker who knew that society and its law
should be organized along the lines dictated by the "science" of eco-
nomics. All they must do is ignore his appreciation for the role the
irrational plays in the life of the law.
131. G. Aichele, supra note 6, at 145.
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